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Panel discussion

"The enhanced role of the IAEA in global security"

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**A major illustration of the enhanced role of the IAEA in global security:
THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL**

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= *Check against delivery* =

Excellencies,
Distinguished Panelists,
Representatives of the civil society,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me thank the Academic Council for organizing this timely debate
on the enhanced role of the IAEA in global security.

In my view, one of the most important and contemporary illustration
of this role can be derived from the Iran nuclear deal. As you all
know, a long term Agreement was reached on the 14th of July 2015 by
the E3/EU+3 group and Iran, on the Iranian nuclear issue. It was later
endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution
2231 adopted on the 20th of July.

This Agreement represents a major achievement of global diplomacy,
to which France is proud to have contributed as early as 2003 when

the process started with Germany and the United Kingdom and later on in the expanded E3/EU+3 format. Throughout this lengthy process, my delegation promoted a “two track approach” by virtue of which the strengthening of sanctions and negotiation process would go in parallel. This two-track approach proved successful. The French delegation also kept a very constant position which Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius referred to as one of “constructive firmness”, insisting on the necessity three essential requirements that are at the heart of the Vienna agreement.

These three requirements are: first, a denial of access to nuclear weapons; second, a strengthened verification regime coupled with a controlled lifting of sanctions; and third, a central role for the IAEA.

Indeed, one cannot overstate the contribution of the IAEA to the robust, verifiable and reliable implementation of this Agreement – the aim of which is to bring an end to a twelve-year international crisis on this issue.

With your kind permission, I would like to come back briefly on the main elements of the agreement, underlining the ones pertaining to the IAEA, explain where we are now in the process and highlight the central role of the Agency in the verification of its implementation.

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I. CONTENT OF THE 14TH OF JULY AGREEMENT

I would like to underline that all the technical features of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were constantly driven by three clear and precise objectives in terms of non-proliferation and credible verification: comprehensive, verifiable and conditional altogether.

1. First, this agreement puts limits on Iranian nuclear capabilities to block access to nuclear weapons

➤ **The uranium path will be covered through restrictions guaranteeing a breakout time of at least one year, over 10 years.**

- Iran will only be able to enrich uranium up to 3.67% for 15 years, and only at the Natanz site. It will not be able to use more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges, for 10 years.
- Iran's enriched uranium stocks will be strictly limited.
- R&D on advanced centrifuges is placed under limitations and no advanced centrifuge shall be operational before expiry of the agreement. The Fordow site, currently used for uranium enrichment, will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre.

➤ **The plutonium path will be covered through restrictions guaranteeing that Iran will not be able to acquire the plutonium needed for a weapon.**

- The Arak reactor will be transformed so as to no longer produce plutonium in military quantity and grade. The reactor's conversion will be carried out under the control of the E3/EU+3 and the IAEA. Spent fuel will be transferred outside of Iran throughout the reactor's life-cycle.
- Iran will not develop further heavy water reactors for 15 years and expresses its intention to not develop any beyond that period.
- Iran commits not to reprocess spent fuel for the extraction of plutonium for 15 years, and expresses its intention not to do so beyond that period.

➤ **A ban on weaponisation activities will be applied**

- Iran commits not to carry out certain activities required for the transformation of nuclear materials into weapons, such as uranium or plutonium metallurgy or detonics.

2. The second objective is that the Agreement provides transparency measures to verify the Iranian nuclear programme

- **Iran commits to implementing and then ratifying the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It also commits to implementing the modified code 3.1.**
- **Iran commits to allowing the IAEA to verify its commitments under the Agreement through specific access procedures and verification measures.**
- **It also commits to clarify to the past and present activities of Iran with a possible nuclear military dimension**
 - The IAEA and Iran have approved a roadmap leading to the clarification of PMD (Possible Military Dimensions) by the end of 2015. That roadmap included an access to the Parchin military site, as well as the possibility for the IAEA to access other sites and meet with Iranian experts. As you know, the IAEA presented its report by the end of last year bringing clarification of the Possible Military Dimension as a prerequisite for the ulterior lifting of sanctions. This report was presented to a special Board of Governors on the 15th of December 2015.

3. Third, it provides for a controlled lifting of sanctions in order to guarantee Iran's fulfilment of its commitments

- **The lifting of economic sanctions will take place on condition of Iran's fulfilment of its nuclear obligations.**
 - The sanctions adopted by the European Union and the United States related to the Iranian nuclear programme and targeting the Iranian financial, energy and transport sectors will be lifted as soon as Iran fulfils its nuclear commitments, as certified by a report from the IAEA.
- **The gradual lifting of UN sanctions will take place on condition of Iran's fulfilment of its nuclear obligations.**

- **Sanctions concerning ballistic missiles and arms trade are upheld (for up to 5 and 8 years respectively, unless the IAEA sooner reaches a broader conclusion that the Iranian nuclear programme is exclusively of a peaceful nature).**
- **Sanctions will be automatically reintroduced in the event of Iran's violation of its nuclear commitments.**
 - A “snap-back” mechanism to reinstate all UN sanctions in the event of Iran’s violation of its obligations will help ensure that Iran fulfils its commitments throughout the duration of the agreement.

A Joint Commission will be set up in order to monitor the implementation of the long-term agreement and to settle disputes between the parties. It will be made up of representatives of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, and will meet in New York, Vienna or Geneva. The Joint Commission will meet at ministerial level every two years in order to review the implementation of the agreement.

Finally the agreement also regulates the fields for civil nuclear cooperation with Iran.

These are the main elements contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But where are we now on the way of the implementation of this agreement and United Nations Security Council resolution 2231?

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II. STEPS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION DAY

Since the 14th of July, many steps were taken towards what is referred to as the Adoption Day and the Implementation Day.

Adoption Day occurred on the 18 October 2015, ninety days after the endorsement of the JCPOA by the Security Council and gave the starting point for the activities Iran had to undertake to be prepared for the Implementation Day. We are still in the process of these preparatory activities and the Implementation Day is still ahead of us.

The IAEA's Director General final assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme was a centrally important step towards reaching the Implementation day of the JCPOA. France commends the work of the IAEA to clarify outstanding issues, including those pointing to possible military dimensions, as set out in the Director General's report in November 2011. According to this report, "*a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003*". The Agency also assesses that "*these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities*" and indicates it has *no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009*".

As required under the JCPOA and on the basis of the Agency's final report, the E3/EU+3 has introduced a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on 15 December, which was adopted by consensus. The text of the resolution was the result of a careful and thorough preparation which allowed the Board to close its consideration of the item "Final assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme".

For the coming years, after the Implementation Day, the Board will remain seized of a new agenda item covering the JCPOA's implementation and the verification and monitoring in Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231. Therefore, the text of the resolution reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the IAEA in implementing the JCPOA together with Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreements, Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1. The IAEA may in that framework wish to raise questions on Iran's past activities related to PMD if it gathers new information in that regard.

In this sense, this resolution of the Board is a forward-looking one, paving the way not only for the Implementation Day but for the period thereafter. We think that it was of major importance to recall its commitments to Iran for the future while turning the page on some of the past issues. Full implementation of the JCPOA in Iran is the best way to assure the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

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III. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE IAEA

Lastly, I would like to touch upon the reaffirmation of the central role of the IAEA, which was of the utmost importance to France, in verifying the implementation of the agreement and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

As I said, the role of the IAEA in the coming months and years cannot be overstated. A major part of the robustness of the agreement in the long term will rely on the IAEA through its verification activities.

First of all, the Implementation Day will only occur after the verification by the IAEA that all the JCPOA requirements are fulfilled.

This date will be the starting point of a long standing work for the Agency.

The Safeguards Department will have to treat, qualify and analyze a lot of information. Inspectors will have to ensure constant verification on the different nuclear sites to confirm that the provided information is accurate and exhaustive. This last part will arguably be the most challenging, as it is always easier to verify the correctness of declaration than to confirm the absence of undeclared activities.

The IAEA has additional tools such as the Additional Protocol and other transparency measures provided for by the JCPOA. Additional access will be possible through the implementation of the Additional Protocol or Annex Q of the JCPOA. But to ensure a credible verification, the cooperation of the Iranian authorities and operators will be crucial. France will carefully follow the full implementation of the JCPOA in the long term. This will go along with a constant support to the IAEA and its Director General's action.

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Restoring confidence step by step will take time.

It will only be achieved when the IAEA is able to draw the Broader Conclusion, not only, that all declared activities in Iran are of a peaceful nature but additionally – and critically – that there are no undeclared activities in Iran.

Thank you.